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Augustinian vs. Maxwellian style
● “Augustinian style” alludes to Augustine of Hippo, who 
introduced Plato’s philosophy into Christianity. He believed 
that the two systems showed some important truths, so 
combining them would enhance our understanding of the 
world. In cognitive semiotics a similar approach is favored by 
Husserl-inspired researchers.
● “Maxwellian style” alludes to James Clerk Maxwell, 
electromagnetism researcher. Maxwell realized that there was a 
gap in our understanding of the world and wanted to create a 
theory of electromagnetism almost from scratch, entirely within 
the paradigm of natural sciences. This approach is virtually non-
existent in cognitive semiotics. This presentation is a proof of 
concept of Maxwellian style analysis in cognitive semiotics.
  
Natural sciences paradigm
To define the paradigm of natural sciences, one would 
need to solve the demarcation problem in philosophy 
of science (how to distinguish science from non-
science?). The following slides do not atempt this: 
they are neither prescriptive, nor normative. They are 
merely a “modest proposal” of how natural sciences 
can (but not should) be understood.
  
Natural sciences paradigm
Explanation:
✔ modelling
✔ intersubjective testability
– falsifiability
– formalizations
✔ puzzles: causal/functional
– answers to why/how 
questions
Description:
✔ classifications/measurement
✔ standardization
✔ intersubjective usability
– formalizations
✔ puzzles: descriptive/classificatory
– answers to what-is-like/what-
is questions
✔ empiricism (“saving the observable phenomena”)
✔ theory ladenness
  
Natural sciences paradigm
Natural sciences paradigm does not require:
✗ quantitative methods (cf. Kuhn 1977, Qine 1986)
– mathematization
✗ publicly scrutinizable objects
– instead: intersubjective access (cf. Popper 2002 [1934])
✗ strong metaphysics (cf. Popper 2002 [1934]; van Fraassen 1980, 2008)
– strong (reductive) physicalism
  
Natural sciences – summary
● Maxwellian-style semiotics atempts to account for 
observable phenomena (empirical adequacy).
● To do this, it proposes models to which observable 
data should “fit.”
● It’s not enough to ofer a comprehensive description of 
researchers intuitions: the models should be 
intersubjectively usable (available to other members of 
the research community).
● The models should allow for puzzle-solving (in Kuhn’s 
1970 sense): they should allow for answering “small” 
specific questions about observable data.
  
Maxwellian style case studies:
● properties of similarity
● salience in indices and metonymies
  
Description: symmetry of similarity
● Puzzle: What is similarity like with respect to 
symmetry of relation?
● Data to account for:
– Foxes are similar to dogs.
– Dogs are similar to foxes.
– Dogs and foxes are similar.
– Dogs and foxes are similar to each other.
  
A descriptive model
LmTr S
● Tr – trajector (compared)
● Lm – landmark (compared to)
● S – similarity (atemporal relation)
(adapted from Langacker 1987, 2008)
Similarity is modeled as a relationship between two entities/phenomena.
  
Symmetry of similarity
dogsfoxes S
foxesdogs S
Foxestr are similar todir dogslm.
antisymmetric: ∃f ∃d ( S(f,d) ∧ ~S(d,f) ∧ f≠d )
Dogstr are similar todir foxeslm.
antisymmetric: ∃d ∃f ( S(d,f) ∧ ~S(f,d) ∧ d≠f )
  
Symmetry of similarity
Dogstr/lm and foxestr/lm are similar.
undirected symmetric: ∃d ∃f S{d,f}
Dogstr/lm and foxestr/lm are similar 
todir each other.
directed symmetric: ∃d ∃f ( S(d,f) ∧ S(f,d) )
Sdogs foxes
Sdogs foxes
  
Explanation: salience in indices and 
metonymies
● Vehicle A is used to refer to target T, because A is 
salient relative to T.
– Puzzle: Why is concept A (rather than concepts B, C, D, 
…) salient?
● Data to account for:
– She’s just a pretty face. 
– ⇗ (arrow as an indexical sign of direction)
  
Explanation: salience in indices and 
metonymies
● Vehicle A is used to refer to target T, because A is salient 
relative to T.
– But why is concept A (rather than concepts B, C, D, …) salient?
● Data to account for:
– She’s just a pretty face. 
Qestion: Why FACE FOR PERSON rather than *CHEEK FOR PERSON?)
– ⇗ (arrow) 
Qestion: Why ARROW FOR DIRECTION rather than *ARCHER FOR DIRECTION?
  
An explanatory model
● Network of contiguity relations
● The network is established in a 
specific cognitive domain (the 
search domain).
● Nodes are characterized by the 
distance from the target (T).
● In principle, the model is 
formalizable with graph theory, 
set theory, and predicate logic.
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Proximity hypothesis
● Ceteris paribus, within a network of contiguity 
relations inside a search domain, the preferred 
vehicle is the closest concept which ensures 
efective reference to the target. The preferred 
search domain is [DIRECT SENSORY OR 
PHYSICAL EXPERIENCE].
  
Analysis
● She’s just a pretty face.
– partitive relations:
PERSONT ← FACEV ← CHEECK
● ⇗ (arrow)
– physical contiguity relations:
DIRECTIONT  ← ARROWV  ← ARCHER
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